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The objective of this paper is to explore the role of human tracking technology, primarily 
the use of global positioning systems (GPS) in locating individuals for the purposes of 
mutual legal assistance (MLA), and providing location intelligence for use in inter-state 
police cooperation within the context of transnational crime. GPS allows for the 24/7 
continuous real-time tracking of an individual, and is considered manifold more powerful 
than the traditional visual surveillance often exercised by the police. As the use of GPS 
for human tracking grows in the law enforcement sector, federal and state laws in many 
countries are to a great extent undefined or even contradictory, especially regarding the 
need to obtain warrants before the deployment of location surveillance equipment. This 
leaves courts ruling on transnational crimes in the precarious position of having to rely on 
age-old precedents which are completely void to the new capabilities of today’s tracking 
technologies. On one side of the debate are civil libertarians who believe the individual’s 
right to be let alone is being eroded to the compromise of human rights, and on the other 
side are law enforcement agencies who wish to provide more precise evidence to judges 
and juries during hearings against suspects (particularly in issues pertaining to national 
security). This paper argues that there is a radical middle position, the via media: that a 
warrant process is legislatively defined and not only for MLAs but also to formalise 
existing informal inter-state police cooperation. Safeguards are required to overcome 
the potential misuse of human tracking technologies by police officials and others in 
positions of power. And this particularly in light of the emerging implantable high-tech 
identification and tracking devices now commercially available. 
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1 Mutual legal assistance in locating the accused 
 Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)1 can be defined as a mechanism by 
which lawyers and the courts of one jurisdiction can request assistance 
from another. MLAs ensure that individuals cannot evade prosecution 
simply because the evidence to prosecute them is located in another 
country. The MLA document states the required assistance sought in the 
provision of evidence for criminal proceedings or proceedings about to 
commence. 2  Depending on the domestic law and that law of the 
requested State, the most common types of assistance that is usually 
obtained includes: witness interviews and material held by third parties 
(such as telecommunication documents, phone records, e-mail, facsimile 
billing and subscriber information).3 This paper deals with the latter and 
specifically the use of covert location-based surveillance. MLAs should be 
used when evidence cannot be gathered using informal police-to-police 
cooperation.  
 In the treaty between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of the United States of America on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, the scope of assistance ranges from ‘providing 
documents, records, and other articles of evidence; locating or identifying 
persons; and executing requests for searches and seizures and for 
                                            
1 Mutual legal assistance was developed during the 1960s but its origins can be found in the 
century-old practice known as “Letters Rogatory.” Letters Rogatory is based on the principle of 
comity, when the ‘… courts of one state address a request to those of another state for judicial 
assistance in the form of taking the testimony of a witness or securing tangible evidence.’ See 
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, International and Comparative 
Criminal Law Series (2003) 352. See also Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International 
Criminal Law (2003) 231. MLAs abide by the locus regit actum rule. 
 
2 International Association of Prosecutors, Basic Guide to Prosecutors in Obtaining Mutual 
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (2004) 2. 
 
3 Ibid. See also, the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth). This Act should be 
read together with the following relevant Australian legislation: Foreign Evidence Act 1994 
(Cth), Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth), 
and the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth). Only by studying the various Acts can one 
appreciate the complexity of MLATs and the various considerations that need to be grasped in 
making a request to a given state, or satisfying a request by another state. 
 
restitution’.4  ‘These forms of legal assistance can be conducted by the 
judicial, prosecutorial or law enforcement personnel of the requested 
state.’5 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) can be bilateral or 
multilateral.6 ‘As of the 1960s, the practice of many states (within Europe, 
Latin America, the United States, and Canada) shifted to bilateral 
MLATs… Still the number of bilateral MLATs is far less than bilateral 
extradition treaties, as is the number of states having national legislation 
on the subject…’7 States have become increasingly willing to negotiate 
MLATs,8 particularly since 11 September 2001 (9/11), as a means to 
increased access of evidence located abroad.9 
 What is unique about MLATs is that they are only really meant to 
benefit governments, and only governments can make exclusive use of 
evidence to satisfy a given request. However, governments are under no 
obligation to provide evidence and they can reject a request based on any 
number of grounds.10 MLATs in most instances contain provisions for 
human rights but through reservations and safeguards which are ‘built-in’ 
                                            
4 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Treaty between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of the United States of America on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and 
Exchange of Notes (2000). 
 
5 Bassiouni, above 1, 354. 
 
6 The 1959 Council of Europe Convention on MLA in Criminal Matters which was ratified in 1962 
was one of the first multilateral treaties and is recognized as an important step in international 
judicial co-operation. See Bantekas, above 1, 234. 
 
7 Bassiouni, above 1, 353. 
 
8 Bantekas, above 1, 231. 
 
9 See, eg, Attorney-General’s Department, Annual Report 2004-2005 (2005) 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE09780
1FF)~80Recent+Statistics.pdf/$file/80Recent+Statistics.pdf> at 1 June 2007. The number of 
requests made by Australia carried forward from 2003–04 were 170, new requests made in 
2004–05 were 151, requests finalized were 126, and requests continuing were 195. The 
majority of requests came from the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and the United States of 
America, and the majority type of assistance granted was for telecommunications and email 
records etc, and bank and business records. A similar number of requests were made to 
Australia, indicating that MLATs are highly reciprocal in nature. 
 
10 Bassiouni, above 1, 354. 
 
to protect the accused. It is important to note, that MLAs can only be 
executed by remaining in accordance with the law of the requested state, 
without violating third party rights. In the context of search for and seizure 
of evidence using location surveillance, this becomes very important.11 
2 Inter-state police cooperation for information gathering 
and sharing 
 Given the number of requests published in annual reports by 
government agencies, and the highly publicized media accounts of 
increasing transnational crime,12  it is obvious that the collection and 
exchange of relevant information pertaining to a transnational criminal 
investigation happens through informal police cooperation at a federal 
level. 13  One can conclude from this that mutual assistance and 
police-to-police assistance are complementary. However, while law 
enforcement and intelligence cooperation is increasing, it is not regarded 
in the same way from a legal perspective. For instance, there are no 
treaties applicable to law enforcement or police cooperation as there are 
for mutual assistance, nor are there codes of conduct for how information 
should be gathered and shared between government agencies.14 When 
                                            
11 Bantekas, above 1, 233-234. See also, Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 
adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/117, subsequently amended by General 
Assembly resolution 53/112 (entered into force 14 December 1990). In the context of human 
rights, see, Ian Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill (es), Basic Documents on Human Rights 
(2002). 
 
12 See, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Seventh United Nations Survey on Crime 
Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1998 - 2000), (2006) 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_cicp_survey_seventh.html> at 4 June 2007. Compare 
with data found in Attorney-General’s Department, above 9. The statistics for MLAs and 
national/international crime trends indicates that a great number of investigations do not go 
through the MLA process but via the more informal police-to-police cooperation route. 
 
13 Bantekas, above 1, 236, 261. ‘Despite the increased willingness of States to engage in formal 
methods of mutual legal assistance, there are many other less formal methods of evidence 
gathering, which permit law enforcement agencies to exchange information and material 
relevant to transnational investigations.’ 
 
14 Bassiouni, above 1, 368. Bassiouni is strong in his stance commenting: ‘[r]egrettably, this 
important form of international cooperation [ie police cooperation in transnational crime] has 
not yet been included in mutual legal assistance treaties.’ 
 
one considers the need for location surveillance15 and other forms of 
covert surveillance, particularly in the gathering of evidence, ‘there are no 
legal or judicial safeguards to insure effective and regulated modalities of 
information-gathering and information-sharing between intelligence, law 
enforcement, and prosecutorial agencies.’ 16  In fact, regulation is the 
major problem here. How are potential abuses combated17 and how is 
effectiveness maintained? How can the accuracy of information be 
guaranteed? And what of privacy when international practices vary 
greatly? These are the challenges that new technologies and emerging 
law enforcement workflows pose on the due process of law. 
 As any other organization in a given jurisdiction, law enforcement 
agencies are bound by national criminal law at the domestic level. Yet, 
many have questioned whether this is enough given that intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies have been quite secretive about their practices. 
For the greater part the way that these particular organizations have 
shared intelligence has been outside legal or judicial supervision.18 Thus, 
the problem is two-fold: (i) a legal framework in most jurisdictions does not 
exist to aid in regulation, and (ii) there is a reluctance of members of the 
intelligence sector to provide transparency in their activities within a 
                                            
15 Katina Michael et al, ‘Location-Based Intelligence – Modeling Behavior in Humans using GPS’ 
(2006) International Symposium on Technology and Society (ISTAS ‘06) 1. 
 
16 Bassiouni, above 1, 369. See also, Commission New South Wales. Law Reform, Surveillance: 
An Interim Report (2001). 
 
17 John S. Ganz, ‘Comment: It’s Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need Warrants 
to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices’ (2005) 95 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 1360. 
‘Finally, again from a policy perspective, some might argue that the failure to require warrants 
could lead to arbitrary and capricious use of GPS by police. As dissenting Nevada Supreme 
Court Justice Robert Rose noted in Osburn, “The automobile’s use is a necessity in most parts 
of Nevada, and place a monitor on an individual’s vehicle effectively tracks that person’s every 
movement just as if the person had it on his or her person… I fear that in some instances, the 
monitor will be used to continually monitor individuals only because law enforcement considers 
them “dirty.” In the future, innocent citizens, and perhaps elected officials or even a police 
officer’s girlfriend or boyfriend, will have their whereabouts continually monitored simply 
because someone in law enforcement decided to take such action. This gives too much 
authority to law enforcement and permits the police to use the vehicle monitor without any 
showing necessity and without a limit on the duration of the personal intrusion.”’ 
 
18 Bassiouni, above 1, 369. 
 
judicial system.19 This issue has been exacerbated since 9/11 when the 
United States demanded that states share more information with them, 
and that their intelligence personnel gather more data so as to curb such 
terrorist20 acts in the future.21 Recent events have shown the power of 
data accessibility, with numerous terrorist plots foiled by intelligence 
organizations, preventing mass casualties.22 But at the same time the 
rights of individuals to know that data is being collected about them, to be 
able to rectify erroneous data, to protect privacy is also important.23 The 
whole debate over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) allegedly located 
in Iraq, which was later proven to be unreliable, indicated the systemic 
flaws in American intelligence which were blamed primarily on 
management.24 Interestingly, the result of this flaw, quite legitimately, was 
for American intelligence agencies to increase information sharing even 
more.25  One can be lead to the hypothesis that greater intelligence 
                                            
19 Ibid. 
 
20 For comparative definitions of terrorism see, Claire De Than and Edwin Shorts, International 
Criminal Law and Human Rights (2003) 231-237. 
 
21 Terrorism is considered to be just one reason why information gathering and sharing practices 
have increased, other notable transnational crimes include: drug and people trafficking, money 
laundering, and the smuggling of things. See eg, the role of intelligence in security informatics 
in Hsinchu Chen, Intelligence and Security Informatics for International Security (2006). 
 
22 See, eg, Transportation Security Administration, Information on Plot to Attack John F. Kennedy 
Airport (2007) <http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/jfk_terror_plot.shtm> at 2 June 2007. 
 
23 Bassiouni, above 1, 370. There are however efforts between nations to broker agreements that 
do try to address data protection principles, at least in theory. See, eg, Agreement Between the 
United States of America and the European Police Officer, Europol file no. 3710-60r2 (Dec 6, 
2001), Supplement Agreement Between the United States of America and the European 
Police on the Exchange of Personal Data and Related Information, Europol file no. 3710/60r3 
(Dec. 20, 2002). “Europol is essentially a police coordination centre for collecting, analyzing 
and sharing information to help investigations being carried out in two or more EU countries”. 
European Commission, Freedom, Security and Justice for All (2004) 19. See also, OECD, 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1981). 
 
24 GlobalSecurity.org, Intelligence: Additional Views of Senator Olympia Snowe (2004) 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2004_rpt/iraq-wmd-intell_olympia-snowe
.htm> at 3 June 2007. 
 
25 Ibid. ‘Surprisingly, the Committee’s review reveals that even after the lack of information 
sharing was found to have played a key role in the intelligence failures of September 11, 2001, 
effectiveness is proportional to the amount of information shared by 
states but this too has implications for privacy. Not only is the balance 
between personal privacy and national security almost impossible to 
achieve but intelligence born from “überveillance-type” regimes can 
introduce the potential for misinformation and misinterpretation. Going to 
one extreme or the other has negative implications- i.e. making all 
personal data public might increase transparency in the short-term but 
may have the equal effect of increasing identity fraud in the long-term, 
and not engaging in any information sharing practices would be 
detrimental to a nation’s security. 
3 The nature of evidence and the new technologies 
 Evidence takes on two basic forms, that which is a written statement 
in place of oral transmission, and anything on which something can be 
recorded. High-tech gadgetry is becoming increasingly useful in storing 
recorded information digitally. Not only can miniature devices do so with 
incredible amounts of storage power but they can do so continually 24/7, 
using very little on-board battery power and with a relatively low degree of 
risk to humans. Digital documentary evidence that has been used in ad 
hoc tribunals for instance includes aerial photography, audio and video 
tapes, maps and sketches of plans, and a variety of digital record formats. 
‘Such evidence is deemed admissible if it contains information of 
probative value.’ 26  Digital evidence especially is prone to tampering 
however this is the emerging context in which courts now have to operate. 
 New technologies, which have allowed for covert surveillance to be 
performed without the permission of a given state, highlight the need for 
                                                                                                                    
intelligence agencies still fail to share information within and among its own cadre. … For 
example, the CIA failed to share information on the reliability of two biological weapons 
sources with all Iraq biological weapons analysts. Information about the credibility of these 
sources, upon which many assumptions regarding Iraq’s biological weapons program were 
made, could have significantly altered analysts’ judgments. In addition, the CIA failed to share 
some intelligence reporting with other agency [unmanned aerial vehicle] UAV analysts on 
critical issues surrounding Iraq’s UAVs. … The Committee’s review shows that the CIA 
continues to overly compartment sensitive HUMINT reporting and that this lack of information 
sharing prevented key analysts on certain issues from making fully informed judgments.’ 
 
26 Bassiouni, above 1, 656. 
 
regulation.27 One need only point to the Echelon operation, which was 
first considered a wild conspiracy, but which was later shown to be a 
mass surveillance operation by the United States, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand on major European industries. ‘It 
was in short a major scandal of governmental industrial espionage 
against friendly states.’ 28  It is not being argued here that new 
technologies should not be exploited to their maximum potential to 
prevent or suppress criminality but they presently remain unregulated. So 
in admitting evidence that has been gathered in another country, national 
courts need to maintain that the evidence has been gathered within the 
confines of a given state’s domestic law, and not by any other means.29 If 
we cannot be confident in this, then not only are we making sweeping 
assumptions about the reach of laws but we are creating a law unto 
ourselves, to do as we please, as we see fit. When comparing the 
comprehensive and robust MLA process (although to some seemingly 
long-winded and bureaucratic), with just-in-time inter-state police 
cooperation, one can come to the resolution that there is a great divide 
that needs to be bridged. With reference to police cooperation, it must be 
said, that better processes with regulations at an inter-state and 
international level, can only increase the likelihood that cross-border 
criminals will be brought to justice and tried under the most suitable laws, 
resulting in a better outcome for all parties concerned.30 
 In an attempt to bridge that gap the United Nations adopted the 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime in 2000 that 
addressed but did not regulate the question of inter-state law enforcement 
cooperation.31 Articles 26-28 raise the matter of bilateral and multilateral 
                                            
27 Bantekas, above 1, 240. ‘Due to the nature of modern telecommunications systems, 
interception frequently does not require technical assistance from other States.’ 
 
28 Bassiouni, above 1, 371-373. 
 
29 Bassiouni, above 1, 374. See also, Bantekas, above 1, 255. Interestingly however, ‘… the 
Court is prepared to focus on the nature of the evidence rather than the fact that human rights 
standards have been breached.’ 
 
30 David Lanham, Cross-border Criminal Law (1997) 44-45. 
 
31 See also, Bantekas, above 1, 236. In Title VI of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) a similar 
hope was set out, to develop ‘common action among Member States in the fields of police and 
agreements inviting ‘… state parties in accordance with their national 
legal systems to develop national legislation permitting special 
investigative techniques’,32 which could then be extended beyond the 
borders and applicable to law enforcement and intelligence organizations. 
The articles specifically addressed forms of electronic surveillance and 
how they might be used in joint investigative operations. For example, 
although it took several years to agree on, Member States finally ratified a 
convention which would allow them in appropriate circumstances to 
intercept communications directly. 33  It should be highlighted that the 
convention was seen as going soft on data protection and in allowing for 
dubious practices such as that of cross-border observation, in actual fact, 
hot pursuit of suspects or fugitives by foreign police officers across 
borders.34 
 There is ‘… no evidence [that] exists outside court proceedings.’35 In 
common law countries facts must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.36 For a definite conclusion to be sought however, the evidence 
which has been gathered must also have been collected with the same 
level of confidence. ‘Implicit in the right to a fair trial is the rejection of 
evidence obtained in breach of fundamental human rights standards.’37 
New technologies and techniques however may not coerce an individual 
                                                                                                                    
judicial co-operation in criminal matters.’ The EU has been to some degree successful at 
achieving these goals, at least insofar as communicating standards, guidelines and protocols 
to Member States. 
 
32 Bassiouni, above 1, 375. See also, Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter (eds), Global Surveillance 
and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity (2005). 
 
33 Bantekas, above 1, 239, 259. ‘In addition to avoiding formal procedures, prosecuting 
authorities engage in informal mutual co-operation practices by simply allowing police officers 
in another jurisdiction access to evidence.’ 
 
34 Ibid 279. 
 
35 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003) 421. 
 
36 Ibid 425. 
 
37 Bantekas, above 1, 254-255, 284. Proceedings from the Corpus Juris Project in Europe stated 
‘(1) [e]vidence must be excluded if it was obtained by community or national agents either in 
violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights…’ 
 
to confessing to a crime, but may apply irregular methods of data 
collection that in some instances could be considered a type of 
intimidation.38 A frequent happening in international criminal proceedings 
is when a prosecutor does not wish to disclose their source of information 
for reasons of confidentiality, safety, or other. 39  Quite often secret 
intelligence organizations are not prepared to tell the public how they 
obtained a particular record or document, and in many instances the 
evidence provided is still accepted.40 Courts are faced with a difficult 
choice when it is obvious that unlawful means have been used to obtain 
evidence- excluding the evidence may mean doing away with the reliable 
information, while admitting it legitimized illicit and irregular modes of 
investigations.41 
4 Human tracking technologies used for location 
intelligence 
 How are authorities able to locate individuals who are suspected of 
transnational crimes for the purpose of MLA requests and inter-state 
police cooperation? ‘Mobility is a basic and indispensable human activity 
that is essential for us to be able to lead independent lives on a daily 
basis’.42 Criminals suspected of a crime- like every other human being- 
                                            
38 Ibid 245, 246. See, eg, ‘[i]n R v Terry, the court also held that the Charter of Rights has no 
effect on law enforcement officials abroad, and as such does not render illegally obtained 
evidence inadmissible. …However, the failure to reject evidence which was obtained not 
merely in breach of foreign law, but also in violation of international human rights standards … 
is lamentable and demonstrates a lack of sensitivity and understanding of the rules operating 
in other legal systems.’ 
 
39 Bassiouni, above 1, 656-657. ‘The problem, however, is when this evidence is provided by 
intelligence agencies who do not wish to have their sources disclosed. This issue of 
confidentiality of sources makes it difficult, if not impossible, to use valuable information.’ 
 
40 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003) 424.  
 
41 Liam Byrne, ‘Admission of Evidence Obtained in Breach of Privacy Laws’ (2007) (78) 
Precedent 21. English, Canadian, American, Australian, Irish and Scottish courts all differ on 
their positions regarding what constitutes ‘lawful methods’ of data gathering for admittance of 
evidence in their courts. 
 
42 K. Kayama, I.E. Yairi and S. Igi, ‘Semi-Autonomous Outdoor Mobility Support System for 
Elderly and Disabled People’ (2003) International Conference on Intelligent Robots and 
require to move around in public space in order to satisfy basic living 
requirements. Someone who is moving can be tracked manually or 
digitally, even if they (or persons harboring criminals) are using cash to 
pay for their every transaction.43 The information being gathered as a 
person moves from one place to the next can be considered a type of 
chronicle or breadcrumb. Today, given the high-tech devices available to 
law enforcement and intelligence organizations, an electronic chronicle44 
and electronic breadcrumb45 can be gathered, stored, and manipulated 
for presentation at a later date. To allow oneself to be tracked can be a 
voluntary act, but in most cases it is imposed by a third party who has 
some control over the end-user.46 Tracking can be obtrusive taking the 
form of overt surveillance 47  (ie the individual knows they are being 
followed), or as in most cases tracking is unobtrusive taking the form of 
covert surveillance (ie the individual is not aware that they are being 
                                                                                                                    
Systems 2606. 
 
43 Stephane Leman-Langlois, ‘The Myopic Panopticon: The Social Consequences of Policing 
through the Lens’ (2003) 13(1) Policing and Society 51, 54. ‘The combination of face 
recognition, motion analysis and sound analysis could become very interesting in the near 
future.’ Leman-Langlois writes of an ‘omniscient surveillance.’ See also, the notion of 
‘überveillance’ in Katina Michael et al, above 15, 7. 
 
44 G. Pingali and R. Jain, ‘Electronic Chronicles: Empowering Individuals, Groups, and 
Organisations’ (2005) IEEE International Conference on Multimedia and Expo 1540. 
 
45 Wherify, Wireless Location Services (2005) <http://www.wherifywireless.com/> at 29 May 
2007. 
 
46 R. Cucchiara, C. Grana, and G. Tardini, ‘Track-based and Object-based Occlusion for People 
Tracking Refinement in Indoor Surveillance’ (2004) Proceedings of the ACM 2nd International 
Workshop on Video Surveillance & Sensor Networks 81-87. Tracking is critical in the process 
‘of people motion capture, people behavior control and indoor video surveillance.’ See also, 
Clive Norris, Jade Moran and Gary Armstrong, Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television and 
Social Control (1998). 
 
47 Stephen Green, ‘A Plague on the Panopticon: Surveillance and Power in the Global 
Information Economy’ (1999) 2(1) Information, Communication & Society 31. ‘In the United 
Kingdom, Newcastle police claim that CCTV has led directly to 2,800 arrests from 1991-9, with 
99 per cent of offenders pleading guilty when presented with video evidence … In contrast to 
more radical libertarian accounts, the key point here is that not every sacrifice of individual 
autonomy and ‘privacy’ is the same as the loss of freedom…’ 
 
tracked).  
 Today, tracking is possible via a vast array of technologies- from GPS 
devices, to radio beepers, electronic mail, and even fixed and mobile 
telephony.48 In fact, the use of a mobile phone in most more-developed 
countries means that a location fix within about 50 meters of the user’s 
handset is possible, just by an individual having their phone on. 49 
Increasingly, mobile phones are also being equipped with GPS chipsets 
which means that if a mobile device is outdoors, a service provider can 
perform a position fix within seconds if a request is made by the police.50 
And it is not only the location position fix that is revealing, even more 
telling is the continuous, real-time location information that can be 
gathered by a GPS, including accurate geodetic information, such as 
longitude and latitude, time and speed.51 Beyond statistical data, location 
intelligence ‘reveals a great deal about one’s preferences, friends, 
                                            
48 William A. Herbert, ‘No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Tracking 
Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?’ (2007) 2(2) I/S: A Journal of 
Law and Policy 410. ‘‘In contemporary American culture, some view the concept of freedom as 
being manifested in consumerism, with the ubiquitous cell phone as a primary symbol. It is 
doubtful that most cell phone users are aware that the same technology that grants them this 
sense of freedom, also results in wireless companies, receiving automatic and continuous 
updates regarding their location. Physical possession of a cell phone renders an individual 
vulnerable to location surveillance by government entities…’ 
 
49 Katina Michael ‘Location-based Services: a Vehicle for IT&T Convergence’ in K. Cheng et al 
(eds), Advances in e-Engineering and Digital Enterprise Technology 467. It should be noted 
that GPS data is not foolproof. Speed miscalculations, location fix inaccuracies, signal 
dropouts, can all occur due to the physical structures that the GPS passes through, and even 
to changes in climatic conditions, and the presence of dense foliage. 
 
50 Leman-Langlois, above 43, 46. ‘First, there is deterrence: overt surveillance aimed primarily at 
discouraging potential offenders from actually committing crimes. Second, intelligence 
gathering: a police force may be interested in collecting images for their information content, to 
build files, understand relationships, create chronologies, etc. Third, evidence: evidence is 
information that meets basic legal requirements and is thus admissible in court to support the 
accusation of a suspect.’ 
 
51 Ganz, above 17, 1329. ‘One model, which a Law Enforcement Technology Magazine reviewer 
called a “vehicle tracking system that would make James Bond envious,” sells for $2,396 per 
unit.  Users pay $59 per month of tracking data used. The product can be attached to a car in 
thirty seconds and operates anywhere in the United States, Canada and Mexico where cell 
towers exist.’ 
 
associations, and habits.’52 Till now law enforcement agencies have used 
GPS to investigate murder cases, drug investigations, robbery, public 
corruption, probation violations and hostage situations. 
5 GPS evidence in Court- case law examples in the United 
States 
 Although GPS technology has been used in law enforcement since 
the early 1990s,53 it is only recently that a few cases have been heard 
regarding the validity of using GPS tracking technology on suspected 
criminals.54 All of the cases presented here are based on case law in the 
United States. The Fourth Amendment in the United States Constitution is 
the main source of legislation pertaining to the protection of an individual’s 
right to privacy. ‘At present, the United States Supreme Court has not 
ruled on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to most recent forms 
of human tracking technology.’55 There have been some landmark cases 
however, that have pointed towards the requirements for warrants to 
conduct surveillance activities. Compare for instance the cases Olmstead 
v. United States with Katz v. United States. In 1928 the United States 
Supreme Court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit 
                                            
52 April A. Otterberg, ‘Note: GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and 
Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment’ (2005) 
46 Boston College Law Review 663. 
 
53 Prior to GPS technology, less sophisticated technology was used, known as beepers. Beepers 
helped locate a vehicle once an event occurred, such as a car door opening or the ignition 
starting, or movement. Beeper technology could alert police officials to locate the originating 
position of the vehicle, and thereafter it would be tailgated using traditional visual surveillance 
means. 
 
54 Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438 (1928). Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967). 
United States v. Knotts, 460 US 276 (1983). United States v. Karo, 468 US 705, 707 (1984). 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 US 27 (2001). State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220 (Wash 2003). 
State v. Peterson, (Cal 2004). People v. Lacey, Indictment No 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676 
(Nassau, NY County Ct. May 6, 2004), People v. Gant, 9 Misc 3d 611 (Westchester, NY 
County Ct. 2005). See also, Otterberg, above 52, 680. ‘Only a few courts have specifically 
considered whether the monitoring of GPS tracking devices is distinguishable from the 
monitoring of the beepers in Knotts and Karo.’ 
 
55 Herbert, above 48, 417. 
 
the action of eavesdropping using telecommunications networks, while 
almost forty years later in 1967 the Court held that the FBI’s use of a 
microphone on the roof of a payphone, without a warrant, constituted a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.56 Still, the Court ruled that using a 
tracking device to monitor vehicles or objects was not subject to the 
expectation of a privacy test. For example, a person traveling in a car on a 
public road from A to B had no reasonable expectation of privacy as he or 
she was out-n-about in full view of the public.57 This decision was again 
reaffirmed in 1983 in the United States v. Knotts case when the Supreme 
Court again ruled ‘that the police did not have to obtain a warrant under 
the Fourth Amendment before using a radio beeper to monitor the 
movement and location of a vehicle.’58 The Court portrayed beepers as a 
mere replication of the traditional, manual, police visual surveillance 
conducted via physically tailing a vehicle.  
 In Kyllo v. United States in 2001 yet another twist to the interpretation 
of the Fourth Amendment was played out. The Supreme Court declared 
that protections within the boundaries of the home were only limited to 
devices that were not in “general public use”.59 When one considers the 
proliferation of mobile telephones many of which are now location-aware 
or GPS devices that are now found in up-market vehicle models, the 
United States human tracking possibilities look vast. What may this mean 
for average citizens wishing to take the law into their own hands and 
begin to track one another? 
                                            
56 Ibid 418-419, 420. ‘… by mandating for the first time that the police obtain a court-ordered 
warrant before engaging in electronic surveillance, the Katz decision established a significant 
judicial check on government agents randomly engaging in such surveillance.’ In Katz it was 
also interesting to note a shift in emphasis from protecting a place where someone resides, to 
protecting the person from government intrusion. 
 
57 The definition of a ‘public space’ and that of a ‘private space’ has been open to debate in recent 
times. Is private only the space in which we reside- the four walls of our home when the blinds 
are down, and the inner lining of our roof? If so what happens when we walk outside our 
doorstep? Or even more precisely if a vehicle that has a GPS unit attached, enters a garage 
which is connected to the home? 
 
58 Herbert, above 48, 420-421. 
 
59 Ibid 424. 
 
 At the state and local levels, courts hold differing positions based on 
their jurisdiction. For the greater part, warrants must be obtained prior to 
the operation of an electronic device to track an individual. In 
Washington’s highest court the power of GPS to be more than a tracking 
device was recognized:  
[U]se of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive method 
of surveillance, making it possible to acquire an enormous 
amount of personal information about a citizen under 
circumstances where the individual is unaware that every 
single vehicle trip taken and the duration of every single stop 
may be recorded by the government.60 
 However, in the cases People v. Lacey and People v. Gant the 
opposite judgment was reached on the same question of warrant 
requirements for a GPS tracking device on a vehicle.61 This seemingly 
contradictory position of the State of Illinois is disturbing especially when 
one considers the federal constitution in context and the requirement for 
inter-state agreements in locating criminals or proceeds of crime. Two of 
the most high profile cases where data was gathered using a GPS and 
admitted as evidence was in the 1999 State v. Jackson and in 2003 State 
v. Peterson. In the Jackson case a judge executed a search warrant on 
Jackson’s vehicles and residence for ten days, and then subsequently 
granted two more warrants which were extensions of time for the police to 
continue with covert surveillance.  
Specifically, data showed that on November 6th, Jackson drove 
his truck to rural Springdale and parked without leaving for 
forty-five minutes. On November 10th, Jackson made a trip to 
Vicari and Springdale, two remote sites, where he remained for 
sixteen minutes and thirty minutes, respectively. The police 
discovered Valiree’s body in a shallow grave at the Springdale 
site and promptly arrested Jackson.62  
                                            




62 Tenison Craddock, ‘Casenote: The Limitations on Police Regarding GPS Tracking Devices: A 
Necessary Hindrance?’ (2005) 9 Computer Law Review & Technology Journal 506-507. 
 
 It was the Jackson case which really demonstrated the power of GPS 
tracking technology to justices all over America, in terms of the privacy 
implications. Counter-arguments grew however as questions were raised 
about trusting law enforcement personnel to act appropriately. 63  In 
addition, the question of the right to privacy by a suspected criminal also 
came to the fore.64  It was not until the Peterson case that a judge 
reaffirmed that GPS location data was acceptable and fundamentally 
valid as a generic methodology to employ in gathering evidence for a 
trial.65 What these example cases reveal is that the warrant process and 
admissibility of evidence varies dependent on the jurisdiction. This is 
magnified when one considers the absence of provisions in an 
international setting.66 
 More recently the reliability of GPS data has come into question. 
While the technology can have almost pinpoint accuracy, it does suffer 
from technological limitations depending on environmental factors. There 
are a growing band of domestic GPS-related cases in the United States, 
which have either been lodged by individuals or unions,67 challenging 
companies or employers regarding GPS accuracy and the individual’s 
right to be let alone.68 In most of the cases to do with accuracy, GPS 
                                            
63 Ganz, above 17, 1325. ‘Global Positioning System (GPS)-based surveillance systems enable 
police to cheaply and easily gather intelligence and evidence they would otherwise have to 
obtain through more costly, cumbersome and risky means such as physical “tails” by pursuing 
officers. The efficiency gains GPS tracking provides are especially significant because they 
enable police to extend their operational capability with minimal incremental spending.’ 
 
64 Craddock, above 62, 510. 
 
65 Ibid 511. 
 
66 Byrne, above 41, 24. ‘Different results can also arise depending on which privacy law is 
breached and what type of proceeding is in question.’ 
 
67 Email from William Herbert to Katina Michael, 10 April 2007. ‘… The union … is currently 
challenging employers who have imposed GPS technology unilaterally on union members.’ 
 
68 See, eg, GPSTrackSys, 7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Okays Surreptitious GPS Tracking 
by Police (4 February 2007) 
<http://gpstrackingsystems.biz/7th-circuit-us-court-of-appeals-okays-surreptitious-gps-trackin
g-by-police/25/> at 1 October 2007. ‘The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable 
search and seizure, but the judges ruled that the placement of a GPS tracking device without 
the suspect’s knowledge, does not qualify as a search of his car. This is the first time the 
speed miscalculations or position fixes are at the heart of the matter- 
employees have either been fined for speeding in a company vehicle (e.g. 
truck), or individual consumers have been charged an additional levy for 
allegedly crossing state boundaries (e.g. car hire).69 In October of 2007, 
there were a few cases reported that stipulated that the U.S. government 
had terminated an employee’s contract based on data collected covertly 
using the GPS chipset in the government-owned mobile handset carried 
by the employee.70  Most of these latter cases have focused on the 
physical location of the employee- e.g. that employees were claiming 
financial remuneration for hours not physically worked at the office. But 
this too is open to misinterpretation- what if the employee worked through 
his/her lunch break, or took work home with them? We can see by this 
example how GPS data can reveal only partial truths and cannot be used 
as the sole piece of evidence. GPS data also has to be stored 
somewhere- and herein lies its greatest weakness- longitude and latitude 
position coordinates can be changed on the fly to fabricate evidence (for 
or against the defendant). Currently only 2 states in the U.S. require a 
company to let an employee know when they are monitoring them. These 
cases are only indicative of potential international issues that may arise 
when GPS is used to track suspects. 
                                                                                                                    
seventh circuit has weighed in on this issue, which other circuits have split on. The court 
equated GPS tracking to police physically following a car, or monitoring safety cameras to 
follow a car, neither of which amounts to illegal search and seizure.’ 
 
69 See, eg, Anita Ramasastry, Tracking Every Move You Make: Can Car Rental Companies Use 
Technology to Monitor Our Driving? FindLaw (23 August 2005) 
<http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20050823.html> at 1 October 2007. ‘First, let’s look 
at the Connecticut case. It arose because American Car Rental had a policy of charging its 
clients $150 for “excessive wear and tear” to the rental car, each time they drove over 79 miles 
per hour. American knew exactly when that occurred because its subsidiary, Acme Rental, 
used GPS installed in its cars to monitor renters’ speed as they traveled. Whenever GPS 
reported that the customer drove at least 80mph for more than two minutes at a time, the 
company charged the customer’s credit or debit card $150.’ 
 
70 See, eg, Allen Stern, Man Fired Thanks to GPS Tracking (31 August 2007) 
<http://www.centernetworks.com/man-fired-thanks-to-gps-tracking> Center Networks at 1 
October 2007. ‘The NY Post reports, “Schools Chancellor Joel Klein yesterday fired a veteran 
worker whose movements were tracked for five months through the GPS device in his 
cellphone, leading to charges that he was repeatedly cutting out early.’ 
 
6 Human rights v. national security 
 Privacy advocates and civil libertarians often point to the erosion of 
human rights through the development and application of novel 
technologies in the area of law enforcement. It is true, that the new 
innovations pose legal and political challenges but a balance must be 
struck between their usage for legitimate purposes such as in the case of 
fulfilling an MLA request or formalised inter-state police cooperation, and 
those that may be considered illegal and a breach of citizen privacy.71 The 
growing problem is not that these technologies are diffused commercially 
but the possibility that if they are used for law enforcement purposes, they 
will eventually find their way into government mandated schemes for the 
general populous.72 In quoting Jacques Ellul, privacy expert David Lyon, 
brings this notion to light: 
“To be sure of apprehending criminals, it is necessary that 
everyone be supervised.” Substitute the word ‘terrorists’ for 
‘criminals’ and we have an uncannily accurate description of 
the world since 9/11.73 
 For now, sweeping legislative changes that have taken place 
post-9/11 have coincided with the widespread diffusion and use of human 
tracking technologies. 74  The United States has been criticized in 
particular for their departure from human rights standards; some even 
                                            
71 Richard Abraham, ‘The Right to Privacy and the National Security Debate’ (2007) 78 
Precedent 33.  ‘…Australia lacks an adequate framework for balancing the right to privacy (and 
human rights in general) against competing rights and interests. … This is not an argument 
against maintaining a strong security agency or enacting national security legislation. Instead, 
it is a call to improve the process by ensuring the effective protection of the very rights they are 
said to protect.’ 
 
72 Otterberg, above 52, 670. ‘…[B]ut what concerns privacy advocates is the tracking of suspects 
and those who have not yet been convicted of any crime. Privacy advocates draw parallels 
between such GPS tracking and the Orwellian state—one where the average citizen must live 
and move about while knowing the government may be watching and scrutinizing the 
individual’s every movement.’ 
 
73 David Lyon, ‘Sorting for Suspects’ (2004) 70 Arena Magazine 26. 
 
74 Alan Davidson, ‘Electronic surveillance regulations’ (2004) 24(9) Proctor 31. ‘The [Patriot] Act 
authorizes nationwide execution of court orders for pen registers, trap and trace devices, and 
access to stored email or communication records.’ 
going as far as concluding that they have shown disregard for the 
fundamental principles of international law.’75 Australia also has received 
similar backlash by international political commentators: 
The new legislation has serious implications for bodily, 
territorial, communications and information privacy, specifically 
the Australian Security Intelligence Organization Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth); Anti-Terrorism Act 
(No. 2) 2005 (Cth); and the Telecommunications (Interception) 
Amendment Act 2006 (Cth).76 
 Perhaps what is most disturbing about the new legislation is its lack of 
clarity in explicitly stating what devices can and cannot be used. For 
instance, in the Australian Commonwealth Anti-Terrorism Act, a tracking 
device is defined as: ‘…any electronic device capable of being used to 
determine or monitor the location of a person or an object or the status of 
an object.’77 An electronic device could range from a GPS wristwatch to 
an electronic ultra high frequency (UHF) bracelet to an invasive 
radio-frequency identification (RFID) implant. In the United States, the 
phrase “electronic instrument” is used instead. 78  While legislation is 
drafted with the knowledge that technology changes occur at a fast pace, 
there is an increasing requirement for clarity, especially as embedded 
‘beneath the skin’ technologies rise to the fore. Chip implants clearly 
violate the individual’s private space, ie, they penetrate the body. For civil 
libertarians the question is who decides whether someone is a suspect to 
                                                                                                                    
 
75 Bantekas, above 1, 18-19. 
 
76 Abraham, above 67, 32. 
 
77 Anti-Terrorism Act (No. 2) 2005 (Cth) s100.1(1) 
 
78 Robert Chalmers, ‘Orwell or All Well? The Rise of Surveillance Culture’ (2005) 30(6) AItLJ 260. 
‘At the COAG meeting, the Commonwealth and States agreed on enhanced tracking (perhaps 
even pre-crime electronic bracelets for people subject to control orders) and other extended 
law enforcement powers, subject to extended sunset provisions.’ See also, Europa, ‘Ethical 
aspects of ICT implants in the human body: opinion presented to the Commission by the 
European Group on Ethics’ (2005) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/97&format=HTML&ag
ed=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=de> at 29 April 2007. 
 
a crime? And if someone is innocent until proven guilty then how can a 
government justify the use of tracking devices upon one of its citizens? 
The argument is that technologies like GPS tracking technology are 
manifold more powerful than police visual surveillance and that high-tech 
devices allow police to monitor people ‘…for a much longer period of time, 
with much less chance of detection.’79 
7 Recommendations 
 There are many recommendations that can be made towards the use 
of human tracking technologies in inter-state police-to-police cooperation. 
However, first there must be an acknowledgment that there is a via media 
in ‘protecting citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy and permitting 
law enforcement officials to do their job.’80 The via media is the radical 
middle, the radical centre, centrism, and the third way philosophy.81 When 
one considers the extreme polar arguments they are inherently flawed. 
Compare for instance the staunch position of some civil libertarians who 
see all forms of surveillance in all circumstance as a degradation of 
human rights versus some secret police organizations who wish to 
by-pass all legal procedures. There is surely a middle position with a 
workable solution. Parts of the solution may include the constitution of 
uniform procedures to be set up and adopted for inter-state police 
cooperation, just as there currently are treaties for MLA requests, police 
self-regulation to be more explicit about the acceptable use of human 
                                            
79 Otterberg, above 52, 697-698. ‘The resultant lengthy, detailed record of one’s location then 
provides a comprehensive picture of one’s life. Location information reveals everything from 
daily habits like stopping at the same coffee shop on the way to work, to associations with other 
people, to visits to locales that reveal much more about a person’s particular characteristics, 
affiliations or beliefs—such as a gay bar, a certain church, synagogue, or mosque; a strip club; 
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80 Simon Bronitt and Henry Mares, ‘Privacy in the Investigative Process: Striking a Balance?’ 
(2002) 14(3) LegalDate 2. See also, Bantekas, above 1, 75. ‘In the preamble [of the Council of 
Europe Convention on Cybercrime] reference is made to the need to maintain a balance 
between the interests of law enforcement and respect for fundamental rights.’ See also, Colin J. 
Bennett and Rebecca Grant (eds), Visions of Privacy: Police Choices for the Digital Age 
(1999). 
 
81 See also, Lanham, above 30, 55. 
 
tracking technologies with embedded prohibitive clauses, and the 
mandate for warrants and court orders to be obtained prior to the 
implementation and monitoring of an individual.82 A more difficult goal to 
achieve is the alignment of state and federal laws of countries pertaining 
to human tracking technologies and their limitations in terms of admissible 
evidence in a trial. 83  This will come with time as more and more 
international cases are heard on the matter of location intelligence being 
used in a court of law to help in the conviction of a criminal.84 These 
recommendations are not merely meant to solve band-aid ‘jurisdictional 
problems’ when police track individuals across state lines but are 
recommendations towards a common protocol.85 Perhaps some of the 
more pressing questions that courts will face in the shorter term are: when 
is it appropriate to use particular types of electronic devices for 
surveillance, for how long, and to monitor what type of activity.86 These 
questions become even more complicated when we consider them 
across borders.87 
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